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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,2 the Court’s unexpected take on 
pleading led a majority of civil proceduralists to treat these decisions 
with apprehension and disappointment.3  Most considered the 
decisions a drastic departure from a century of precedent in favor of 
liberal notice-pleading standards that threatened to close the gates of 
justice to many meritorious, if inexactly pleaded, claims.4  On the 
other hand, those that agreed with the decisions felt that they 
constituted a much needed check on wasteful litigation and 
expensive discovery battles based on no more than the most 
speculative of legal theories.5 
 
*J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A., English and 
History, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 2011. 
 1  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 2  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 3  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen 
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010); Elizabeth 
M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact 
on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 185 (2010); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15 (2010); Howard M. 
Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 157 (2010). 
 4  See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal 
Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 65 (2010) (criticizing “plausibility” pleading and its effect on civil 
actions in general and civil rights cases in particular, where informational inequities 
abound). 
 5  See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 
1091–92 (2009) (“Twombly must be viewed as part of a broader trend in which the 
Court recognizes the importance of imposing real and meaningful judicial scrutiny 
at the pleading stage, particularly as cases become more costly and complex to 
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Rarest of all are the commentators that predicted a tempered 
application of the cases’ “plausibility” language.6  This Comment 
aligns itself with this small group by focusing on recent empirical 
studies and case law surveys that show how little has changed since 
Twombly and Iqbal. 
Perhaps it is best at the outset to say what this Comment does 
not do.  This Comment does not take a position on whether the 
Supreme Court was right to make its changes in the two decisions.  
That is for another publication, and indeed, tomes could be made 
from the many articles written on the topic.  Instead, this Comment 
has two main goals: first, to synthesize and analyze the most recent 
empirical data on the current state of pleading, which led to the 
conclusion that Twombly and Iqbal did not cause the much-feared 
seismic shift to pleading that many predicted; and second, to suggest 
reasons for these unexpected results.  The goal of this Comment is to 
plan the appropriate next steps for pleading standards given the 
much needed, tempered reevaluation put forth below. 
Part II of this Comment will explain the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal.  Beginning with Twombly, the first of 
the two to go before the Court, this Part will address the Court’s 
attempt to effect change in the standard for sufficient pleading under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (Rule 8)—that is, in relevant part, 
that a complaint must now satisfy a “plausibility” standard.  Part II will 
then go on to explain how the Court’s decision in Iqbal solidified that 
standard’s place in federal civil trials.  Part III will draw from 
representative sets of academic, judicial, and legislative materials 
published in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal that express deep concern 
over, and confusion about, the decisions.  By a significant measure, 
these voices represent the majority in the legal community.  Part IV 
summarizes and synthesizes empirical studies conducted by the 
Federal Judicial Center, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, and a 
case law survey conducted by Andrea Kuperman, the Advisory 
Committee Clerk.  Taken together, these Reports show that civil 
complaints are not affected by motions to dismiss any more than they 
were in the years leading up to Twombly.  Finally, Part V will argue 
that the courts, collectively, are applying a tempered interpretation of 
 
litigate.”). 
 6  See Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
473, 474 (2010) (“Rather than decrying Twombly as a radical departure and seeking 
to overturn it, this Article instead emphasizes Twombly’s connection to prior law and 
suggests ways in which it can be tamed.”); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010). 
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Twombly and Iqbal and will suggest common trends among the circuit 
courts for applying “plausibility.”  It will then suggest that these 
under-utilized findings demand more attention than they are 
currently receiving, and that the case law shows a consistency of 
application that future breaks from precedent or rule amendments 
would only upset. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF PLAUSIBILITY: TWOMBLY & IQBAL 
A. Conley v. Gibson7 
In 1957, the Supreme Court addressed the standards for 
sufficient pleading under Rule 8.8  Although not the first case before 
the Court concerning pleading standards, Conley v. Gibson introduced 
the paradigmatic “no set of facts” language that would guide 
procedural precedent for decades to come.9 
Conley involved a labor relations suit brought under the Railway 
Labor Act by African-American rail workers against their national 
union, its local branch, and the officers of both.10  Facing allegations 
that they failed to adequately represent their African-American 
members against discriminatory firings, the union defendants raised 
a successful motion to dismiss at the trial level, which the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed.11  Writing for the Court, however, Justice Black reversed the 
ruling, noting the following: 
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of 
 
 7  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
 8  Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a) reads:  
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must 
contain: 
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 
jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the 
claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may 
include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.   
The Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938, largely in response to the perceived 
flaws inherent in previous pleading regimes: English common law pleading, with its 
writ system and issue pleading; and code pleading, which, in the United States, 
replaced the common law approach with fact pleading and recognized the civil 
action.  See Peter Julian, Charles E. Clark and Simple Pleading: Against a “Formalism of 
Generality”, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1184–87 (2010). 
 9  Conley, 355 U.S. at 45; see Smith, supra note 5, at 1069 (describing the language 
from Conley as a “longstanding interpretation of the Federal Rules”). 
 10  Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.   
 11  Id. at 42–44.  
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course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.12 
The opinion continued: 
[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a 
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases 
his claim.  To the contrary, all the Rules require is “a short 
plain statement of the claim” that will give the defendant 
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds 
upon which it rests.13 
Relying on that proposition, the Court ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor.14 
From a substantive perspective, the decision was just one piece 
in the larger push for justice in the civil rights era.15  From a 
procedural scope, though, Conley was one of the most pivotal cases of 
the twentieth century, and the Court’s “no set of facts” language was 
fundamental to the modern understanding of pleading.16  Over the 
next half-century, the decision was one of the most frequently quoted 
procedural expressions, and many considered it to be the 
embodiment of the Federal Rules’ commitment to liberal pleading 
standards.17 
B. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 
Coming before the Court in late 2006, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 
presented the high court justices with the opportunity to address 
pleading standards for one of the first times since Conley—this time, 
in an antitrust context.18  William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus 
represented a putative class consisting of local telephone and high-
speed Internet service subscribers against a group of Incumbent 
Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs).19  As the opinion explains, ILECs 
made up a system of regional service monopolies that resulted from 
the 1984 divestiture of AT&T’s local telephone business.20  ILECs 
 
 12  Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
 13  Id. at 47 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 
 14  Id. at 48. 
 15  Andrew I. Gavil, Civil Rights and Civil Procedure: The Legacy of Conley v. Gibson, 
52 HOW. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2008). 
 16  Id. at 1. 
 17  Id. at 1–2. 
 18  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 19  Id. at 550. 
 20  Id. at 549. 
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enjoyed their regional monopolies until the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, which obligated ILECs to share their networks with 
competitors, known as competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).21 
Under two circumstantial theories, the plaintiffs alleged 
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act,22 a federal law that 
prohibits businesses from engaging in certain types of 
anticompetitive conduct.23  First, the complaint alleged that the ILECs 
engaged in parallel business behavior in their respective regions 
against CLECs that frustrated and sabotaged the CLECs’ operations 
so as to inhibit their growth.24  Second, it alleged that the ILECs 
agreed not to compete with each other, as inferred from their 
common failure to pursue appealing business opportunities in 
neighboring markets.25  The Supreme Court granted certiorari after 
the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit disagreed 
over whether the allegations met the standard for factual sufficiency 
and could survive a motion to dismiss.26 
Justice Souter, writing for the seven-member majority, reversed 
the Second Circuit’s denial of the motion to dismiss and strongly 
addressed the Court’s Rule 8 precedent.27  Over Justice Stevens’ 
forceful dissent, Justice Souter took a hardline approach to Conley’s 
“no set of facts” language that, in the Justice’s view, “has been 
questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough.”28  The 
opinion locates this criticism’s source in Conley’s lenient language 
that, if read literally, would allow wholly conclusory statements to 
survive a motion to dismiss and, essentially, allow plaintiffs to engage 
in expensive discovery fishing expeditions.  Courts, the majority 
contended, have read Conley as pleading guidelines, rather than 
 
 21  Id. (citations omitted). 
 22  Id. at 550; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations”). 
 23  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. at 551. 
 26  Id. at 552–53.  The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that 
parallel business conduct was insufficient on its own to state a claim under § 1 and 
adding that the plaintiff needed to plead additional factual allegations that tended to 
exclude the ILECs’ independent self-interest as an explanation.  Id. at 552 (citing 
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).  The Second 
Circuit reversed, holding that “plus factors are not required to be pleaded to permit 
an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive.”  Id. at 553 (quoting Twombly 
v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)) (emphasis in original). 
 27  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 28  Id. at 562. 
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applying its literal requirements.29  As such, Justice Souter goes on to 
write in no uncertain terms, “after puzzling the profession for 50 
years, this famous observation has earned its retirement.”30 
In its place, the Court adopted what appeared to be a 
“plausibility” requirement.31 
The majority organized the Court’s Rule 8 precedent as follows: 
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . a 
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the “grounds” of his 
“entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action will not do . . . .  Factual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level . . . .32 
As to how far above the speculative level factual allegations must 
reach, the opinion answered— in what seemed to be exclusively the 
antitrust context—by asking for plausible grounds to read an anti-
competitive agreement into a complaint.33  It then noted, though, “we 
do not require heightened fact pleading on specifics, but only 
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”34  
With its opinion, the majority changed the direction of its pleading 
jurisprudence, but the scope of this redirection was not entirely clear. 
The entire Court did not view this redirection favorably.  Justice 
Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined in three of four parts, 
wrote a pointed dissent, calling Justice Souter’s opinion a “dramatic 
departure from settled procedural law.”35  The crux of the dissent 
flowed from the historical motivations behind Rule 8 and Conley’s 
 
 29  Id. (“[A] good many judges and commentators have balked at taking the 
literal terms of the Conley passage as a pleading standard.”) (collecting cases). 
 30  Id. at 563.  To add to the confusion this decision created, two weeks after 
Justice Souter “retired” Conley’s language, the Court seemed to reaffirm the standard 
that Conley represented in Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).  In that case, the 
Court, quoting both Twombly and Conley, wrote, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; 
the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.’”  Id. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
apparent inconsistency led several courts to question whether Twombly did, in fact, 
abrogate Conley to the extent many predicted.  See, e.g., Hamilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 
816, 817 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Twombly and Iqbal did not abrogate the notice pleading 
standard of Rule 8(a)(2).”). 
 31  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
 32  Id. at 555 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 33  Id. at 570. 
 34  Id. 
 35  Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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connection to notice pleading’s history.36  Conley’s language, Justice 
Stevens wrote, “captures the policy choice embodied in the Federal 
Rules and binding on the federal courts.”37  In his view, the policy 
choice was to rework the procedural system from a stringent code-
pleading standard riddled with procedural pitfalls to a notice-
pleading system, which made it easier for plaintiffs to get their day in 
court.38  According to the dissent, the majority opinion’s call for the 
pleading of facts was antithetical to this choice.39  Even worse, the 
majority’s reading of Conley “express[es] an evidentiary standard, 
which the Conley Court had neither need nor want to explicate.”40  
Justice Stevens argued that the majority was rewriting the federal 
pleading rules when the case’s resolution did not require that and, 
further, did so outside of the deliberative procedures that the federal 
courts have for making such a change.41  Ultimately, Justice Stevens 
viewed “plausibility” as a new heightened and misguided pleading 
standard.42 
C. Ashcroft v. Iqbal 
Two years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court made its intentions 
in Twombly more explicit and elaborated how Rule 8 sufficiency-of-
pleading issues should be addressed in the future.  John Ashcroft, the 
former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), petitioned 
the Supreme Court after the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of 
their motion to dismiss Javaid Iqbal’s complaint.43  Iqbal, a Muslim 
and a citizen of Pakistan, was arrested in the United States as part of a 
large investigation relating to the September 11th terrorist attacks 
and was held in custody as a “high interest” detainee.44  After 
deportation pursuant to his guilty plea, Iqbal brought suit against a 
bevy of federal officials, alleging deprivations of his constitutional 
 
 36  Id. at 573–77.  The intent-of-the-rules-drafters argument in Stevens’ dissent was 
adopted by many critics of the decision.  See infra note 81 and accompanying text.  
 37  Twombly, 556 U.S. at 583 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 38  Id. at 579. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. at 580. 
 41  Id.  
 42  Id. at 582. 
 43  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009). 
 44  Id. at 666–67.  “High-interest” detainees were held under the most restrictive 
conditions allowable in federal prisons, which prevented these detainees from 
communicating with the general prison population.  Id. at 667–68.  
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rights during his detainment.45  As to Ashcroft and Mueller, the 
complaint alleged that Iqbal’s harsh confinement was the result of an 
unconstitutional policy that the two men adopted on account of his 
race, religion, or national origin.46 
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, reversed 
the Second Circuit’s decision and held that Iqbal’s pleadings were 
insufficient.47  The issue called on the Court to address ambiguities in 
its Twombly decision.  Returning to that opinion, Justice Kennedy 
derived a two-step process from Justice Souter’s earlier analysis for 
determining a complaint’s sufficiency under Rule 8: first, the court 
need not accept as true any allegations contained in the complaint 
that are merely legal conclusions; second, sufficient complaints must 
state a plausible claim for relief.48 
As to the first working principle, Justice Kennedy read out of 
Twombly that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”49  The 
Justice added, “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from 
the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does 
not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing 
more than conclusions.”50  The court must weed through a complaint, 
searching for its “nub”—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual 
allegations—and isolate those for a determination of their 
sufficiency.51  As to the second principle, the court will determine a 
complaint’s sufficiency by assessing whether the claims have been 
nudged “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”52  This 
“context-specific task” that draws on “judicial experience and 
common sense” requires enough well-pleaded facts to “permit the 
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.”53 
The allegations in Iqbal’s complaint, according to the majority 
that did not include Justice Souter, failed to nudge across the line to 
plausibility.54  As per the first step, the majority engaged in the 
 
 45  Id.   
 46  Id. at 666. 
 47  Id.  
 48  Id. at 678–79. 
 49  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 
(2007)). 
 50  Id. at 678–79. 
 51  Id. at 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565–66). 
 52  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 
 53  Id. at 679 (citation omitted). 
 54  Id. at 680.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
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weeding-out process by separating the conclusory from the 
nonconclusory allegations.  The majority labeled Iqbal’s allegations 
that Ashcroft was “‘the principal architect’ of [this] invidious policy” 
and that he “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject’ [Iqbal] to harsh . . . confinement ‘. . . solely on 
account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin,’” as nothing 
more than “formulaic recitations of the elements” of a constitutional 
discrimination claim and thus could not be accepted as true.55  Next, 
the Court isolated and assessed the remaining nonconclusory 
allegations that were entitled to assumptions of truth.56  Those 
allegations stated: 
[T]he [FBI] under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, 
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as 
part of its investigation of the events of September 11. . . . 
[and] [t]he policy of holding post-September-11th 
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement 
until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by 
Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in 
the weeks after September 11, 2001.57 
The question, as per the second step, was whether these 
nonconclusory allegations were plausible, and not merely 
conceivable.  The majority accepted as true the allegation that Arab 
Muslim men were being detained, and Ashcroft and Mueller 
approved of the policy.58  Nonetheless, although these allegations 
were consistent with petitioners’ theory of an unconstitutional 
discriminatory policy, the Court held Iqbal’s claims to be implausible 
in light of “more likely explanations.”59  The Court found an obvious 
alternative explanation whereby anybody involved with the Arab 
Muslim September 11th perpetrators would likely also happen to be 
Islamic Arabs.60  To the majority, it was no surprise that “a legitimate 
policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals 
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a 
[constitutionally permissible] disparate, incidental impact on Arab 
 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.  Interestingly, Justice Souter, who penned the 
Twombly decision, filed a dissenting opinion here, in which Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.  Id. at 665. 
 55  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–81 (2009) (quoting the complaint). 
 56  Id. at 681. 
 57  Id. (quoting complaint) (internal citations omitted). 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
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Muslims.”61  Interestingly, though, the majority acknowledged that if 
they were required to read the allegation as true, the complaint 
would survive the motion to dismiss.62  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that, under Twombly’s standard, the complaint failed to 
‘“nudge Iqbal’s claims’ of invidious discrimination ‘across the line 
from conceivable to plausible.’”63 
Conversely, the dissenting Justices, led by Justice Souter, 
considered these allegations to be outside the realm of mere legal 
conclusions when read in the appropriate context of the full 
complaint.64  While Justice Souter agreed that the two statements 
singled out by the majority do not state a plausible entitlement to 
relief, “[t]he fallacy of the majority’s opinion . . . lies in looking at the 
relevant assertions in isolation.”65  Had it read the complaint 
holistically, giving due attention to the subsidiary allegations, the 
majority would not have been left with merely these two statements.66  
According to Justice Souter, the majority had improperly isolated the 
parts of the complaint that list the elements of the claim and labeled 
them as bare conclusions.  Yet Iqbal’s complaint goes beyond merely 
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a constitutional 
discrimination claim because the elements are preceded by a 
description of “a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy detailed in 
the complaint.”67  Taking the complaint as a whole, the allegations 
should have been assumed true.68  Furthermore, the allegations were 
plausibly true, and not merely consistent with illegal conduct.69  The 
dissent stated that, contrary to the conduct in Twombly, which was 
“consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with” rational 
business strategy, here Iqbal’s allegations of discriminatory policy and 
Ashcroft’s knowledge and deliberate indifference could not be 
consistent with legal conduct.70  As such, the complaint should have 
 
 61  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682. 
 62  Id. at 686 (“Were we required to accept this allegation as true, respondent’s 
complaint would survive petitioners’ motion to dismiss.  But the Federal Rules do not 
require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its 
factual context.”). 
 63  Id. at 680 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). 
 64  Id. at 696–97 (Souter, J., dissenting).   
 65  Id. at 698. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 698. 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. at 696. 
 70  Id. at 696–97. 
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been deemed plausible on its face.71 
Plainly, the Iqbal Court’s attempt to address the ambiguities in 
Twombly was not very successful.  The majority did respond to several 
arguments that attempted to define the decision’s scope.  First, 
answering Justice Stevens’ question in Twombly, the Court refused to 
limit its decision in that case to pleadings made in the antitrust 
context, noting that Twombly was based on the Court’s interpretation 
and application of Rule 8.72  Second, the trial court’s case 
management and discovery controls do not temper the application of 
the plausibility standard, even in cases like Iqbal’s where the trial 
judge made clear his desire to limit discovery for the petitioners.73  
But as Justice Souter’s dissent illustrates, the application of a 
“plausibility standard” was still somewhat nebulous, especially 
considering the Justice’s belief that the majority “misapplie[d] the 
pleading standard” that he penned in Twombly.74  The end result was 
two decisions that attacked head-on over a half-century of procedural 
precedent and created additional problems that were not fully 
reconciled. 
III. THE SUBSEQUENT PANIC: RESPONDING TO TWOMBLY AND IQBAL 
While Twombly and Iqbal left significant procedural questions 
hanging in the air, it opened the floodgates to a legal community in 
search of answers.  Yet, as is the case with most legal ambiguities, 
answers were not easy to come by.75  The lingering uncertainty about 
proper pleading standards and access to courts bred anxiety among 
legal scholars,76 the judiciary,77  commentators,78 and practitioners79 
 
 71  See Id. at 696–97. 
 72  Id. at 684. 
 73  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684–85. 
 74  Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 75  See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We 
are not alone in finding the opinion confusing.”) (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 
157 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 76  See sources cited supra note 3. 
 77  In fact, not long after Iqbal, Justice Ginsberg publically remarked: “[i]n my 
view, the [Iqbal] Court’s majority messed up the Federal Rules.”  Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Remarks for Second Circuit 
Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov
/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_06-12-09.html. 
 78  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil 
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10.  This article, which read Iqbal as “mak[ing] 
it much easier for judges to dismiss civil lawsuits right after they are filed,” quotes 
Thomas C. Goldstein, an appellate lawyer with Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld in 
Washington: “Iqbal is the most significant Supreme Court decision in a decade for 
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alike.  When the legal community published on the issue, fear and 
panic became the common theme. 
The overarching concern is that the Supreme Court’s decisions 
regress pleading standards to the earlier, painfully strict fact or code 
pleading process.80  Twombly and Iqbal signaled for many critics a 
move away from the simplicity for which Rule 8 asked—a move that 
they believe was not intended by the Rule’s drafters.81  The drafters’ 
intentions, critics often mention, were guided by two procedural 
decisions: to reshape civil litigation to allow more access to courts and 
to promote a complaint’s adjudication based on its merits, rather 
than to require dismissal for mere procedural slip-ups.82  Such priority 
changes brought about by the Federal Rules were guided by the 
philosophy that justice could only be served by allowing citizens to 
fully enforce their rights.83  This concept echoed the baseline 
democratic tenet upon which civil rights, distributive justice, and 
equal opportunity rested.84  Thus, many critics fear that a 
“plausibility” standard attacks the most basic policy goals that Rule 8 
seeks to protect. 
Fearing that the Rule’s fundamental principles were under 
attack, the backlash was powerful.  One author wrote, “[t]he 
Supreme Court should put a notice on all federal courthouse doors: 
STOP- ENTRANCE BY INVITATION ONLY!”85  Another stated 
 
day-to-day litigation in the federal courts.”  Id.  
 79  See Vince Warren on Access to Justice in Federal Courts (NYU Law), CCRJUSTICE.ORG, 
http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/videos/vince-warren-access-justice-federal-courts-
new-york-university-school-law (Jan. 2010). 
 80  See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20 (2010) (“[T]he pleading 
requirement has become one of notice-plus.  In reality, that is a form of fact pleading 
by another name.”).  In many ways, this baseline principle is guided by, and 
sometimes merely reiterates, Justice Stevens’ dissent in Twombly.  C.f. Clermont & 
Yeazell, supra note 3, at 832–33 (arguing that the Court did not readopt fact 
pleading, but created an unprecedented test for “factual convincingness”). 
 81  Miller, supra note 80, at 19 (“By establishing plausibility pleading, Twombly and 
Iqbal, have transformed the function of a complaint from Conley’s limited role by 
imposing a more demanding standard that requires a greater factual foundation 
than previously was required or originally intended.”); see also Benjamin Spencer, 
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 433 (2008) (“[T]he Court’s new standard is a 
direct challenge to the liberal ethos of the Federal Rules.”). 
 82  See Miller, supra note 80, at 4–5; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. 
REV. 909, 956–61 (1987). 
 83  Miller, supra note 80, at 5. 
 84  Id. 
 85  David A. Green, Friend or Foe: The Supreme Court’s “Plausible Claim” Standard 
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tersely, “notice pleading is dead,” adding that the Court’s decision 
was “an unwarranted interpretation of Rule 8.”86  Yet another 
portended that the Court’s “brave new procedural world,” if adopted 
by the lower courts, would lead to “a procedural revolution,” and that 
the Court invented a “new and foggy test” for judging the sufficiency 
of a complaint that has “destabilized the entire system of litigation.”87  
These critics’ voices found support in nascent statistical studies which 
suggested that their nightmares were becoming reality, as rates of 
granting motions to dismiss appeared to rise.88 
Branching from this core philosophical concern were voices 
within specific substantive areas that feared significant frustration of 
claimants.  The most vociferous opponents emerged from civil 
rights89 and labor and employment90 litigation areas.  In these areas, 
critics lamented the added power these decisions gave to federal trial 
judges, whom some scholars and practitioners already believed to be 
making pleading very burdensome for plaintiffs.91  This was a 
response, no doubt, to the lack of clarity in Twombly and Iqbal, and 
the hypothetical scenarios in which civil rights plaintiffs do not have 
the necessary information at hand to survive a 12(b)(6) motion are 
 
Provides Another Barrier for Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Cases, 39 S.U. L. REV. 
1, 1 (2011) (emphasis in original). 
 86  Spencer, supra note 81, at 431, 433. 
 87  Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 3, at 823, 838.  
 88  By 2010, these studies suggested a greater frequency of dismissal under 
Twombly and Iqbal than under Conley.  See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: 
Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2010) (finding 
that after Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal, respectively, Rule 12(b)(6) motions were 
increasingly granted); Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95, 118 
(2010) (finding dismissals increased from 54.2 percent to 64.6 percent in disability 
cases after Twombly); Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading 
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (2009) 
[hereinafter Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly] (finding a higher rate of dismissals in 
Title VII cases after Twombly); but see Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About 
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (stating that Twombly has had “almost no 
substantive impact” except in civil rights cases). 
 89  See, e.g., Hatamyar, supra note 88, at 556 (finding a significant increase in the 
rate of dismissal in a sample of Westlaw cases, especially for civil rights cases); 
Hannon, supra note 88, at 1837 (examining Westlaw cases and finding that the courts 
do not seem to be dismissing cases at a significantly higher rate, except for civil rights 
cases, where the rate of granting dismissal jumped by eleven percent).  
 90  See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 3. 
 91  Id. at 521.  For commentary on the general frustrations that discrimination 
claims face, see Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 131–32 
(2009). 
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not hard to imagine.  Early empirical studies seemed to justify these 
concerns.  These studies, compiled by academics and law students, 
revealed a disproportionate increase in the dismissal of civil rights 
cases in the months following the Court’s decisions.92  For example, 
one law student’s study, which sampled data from 3,287 district court 
cases, found that post-Twombly civil rights suits were 39.6% more 
likely to be dismissed than other suits.93  The strengthened gate-
keeping power with which Twombly and Iqbal furnished judges 
appeared to be making an immediate impact in exactly the way these 
critics envisioned. 
Indeed, concern reached a fever pitch when members of 
Congress took action to address these perceived problems.  In 
October 2009, the House of Representatives called a hearing, held by 
the Judiciary Committee, tellingly titled “Access to Justice Denied: 
Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal.”94  Swiftly on the heels of the hearing, 
Senator Arlen Specter proposed a bill that echoed the Judiciary 
Committee’s concerns.  Titled the “Notice Pleading Restoration Act 
of 2009” (the “Act”), the Act was designed to negate Twombly and 
Iqbal’s effect by reinstating Conley’s “no set of facts” language.95  The 
Act would have provided that “Federal courts shall not dismiss 
complaints under rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson . . . .”96  In Senator 
Specter’s introduction to the Act, he indicated that one of his major 
concerns with the Supreme Court’s decisions was “that the Court had 
closed the courthouse doors to plaintiffs with meritorious claims and 
limited the private enforcement of public law.”97  The same year, a 
similar bill was introduced in the House.  The Open Access to Courts 
 
 92  See Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly, supra note 88, at 1014 (“[A] higher 
percentage of decisions . . . granted a motion to dismiss in the Title VII context when 
the courts relied on Twombly.”); Hannon, supra note 88, at 1815 (“The rate of 
dismissal in civil rights cases has spiked in the four months since Twombly.”).  
 93  Hannon, supra note 88, at 1838 (listing the data and explaining her 
methodology). 
 94  Access to Justice Denied: Hearing on Ashcroft v. Iqbal Before the H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  During the hearing, civil rights organizations’ representatives testified about 
Iqbal’s effect on access to courts, including employment discrimination cases and civil 
rights cases. 
 95  Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 96  Id. 
 97  156 CONG. REC. S11, 037-05 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2010) (statement of Sen. Arlen 
Specter). 
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Act of 2009 was proposed, which provided that: “[a] court shall not 
dismiss a complaint under subdivision (b)(6), (c) or (e) of Rule 12 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim 
which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.”98  Both bills were referred 
to the Judiciary Committees but no further action was taken.  
Nonetheless, these proposals were symbolic of the deep concerns that 
these cases engendered from all facets of the legal community. 
IV. ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER STUDIES 
A. Advisory Committee Reports, 2007–2012 
In 2007, immediately after Twombly, the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules also took notice that the Court’s two decisions were 
retiring Conley’s “no set of facts” language.  The Advisory Committee99 
is charged with carrying out “continuous study of the operation and 
effect of the general rules of practice and procedure.”100  The Court’s 
engagement with Rule 8 was an issue that fell directly within the 
Committee’s province. 
After Twombly, the Advisory Committee sought to address “[t]he 
basic question [of] whether—and if so, when—to begin crafting 
formal rules amendments to channel, redirect, modify, or even 
retract whatever changes in notice pleading flow from . . . Twombly.”101  
 
 98  Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
 99  A quick note about the structure of these entities is instructive:   
The Judicial Conference of the United States consists of the Chief 
Justice of the United States, Chairman, the Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Chief Judge of the 
Court of International Trade, the chief judges of the other twelve 
United States courts of appeals and twelve district judges chosen for a 
term of three years by the judges of each circuit at an annual judicial 
conference of the circuit.  The Judicial Conference meets twice every 
year to consider administrative problems and policy issues affecting the 
federal judiciary and to make recommendations to Congress 
concerning legislation affecting the federal judicial system.  The 
Judicial Conference created the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (Standing Committee) and various Advisory Committees 
(currently one each on Appellate Rules, Bankruptcy, Civil Rules and 
Criminal Rules) . . . .  An Advisory Committee considers suggestions 
and recommendations received from any source, new statutes and 
court decisions affecting the rules and relevant legal commentary. 
Thomas E. Baker, Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 323, 328–29 (1991). 
 100  Id. at 239 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988). 
 101  Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil 
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Nonetheless, the Committee thought it best at that moment to “keep 
a close watch on the evolution of practice as courts seek to digest and 
implement [Twombly].”102  Contrary to the calls for immediate reform 
from other sections of the legal community, the Committee decided 
on a patient approach that would promote two goals: first, “to get a 
better sense of how others understand Twombly, and how it has had 
whatever impact it has had in the very short term of its present life.  
[Second,] to consider the alternative opportunities that may be 
available to amend present rule texts.”103 
The Advisory Committee returned to the issue post-Iqbal and 
after a two year hiatus.  The Committee’s December 2009 Report (the 
“2009 Report”) revealed the results from some of the earliest 
empirical work done on the issue, which was a compilation of 
statistics on the frequency of motions to dismiss, and the rate of 
granting these motions.104  The 2009 Report noted that “the 
preliminary data suggest that things have not changed much—the 
monthly rate of granting motions to dismiss made on any ground was 
13.15% of the monthly rate of filing cases during the 4 months before 
the Court decided Twombly, while the rate during the 4 months after 
the Iqbal decision was 13.78%.”105  On these findings, the Committee 
rightly held fast to its commitment to patient investigation: “The 
questions are simply too important and too difficult to be resolved by 
rapid response.”106  In a moment of calm insightfulness, and possibly 
acknowledging the commentators’ responses, the Committee 
cautioned that “[f]aith challenged reacts vigorously,” recognizing 
that a rash response would not help the situation.107 
In May of the following year, the Committee came to the 
conclusion that “it does not seem that any dramatic changes have 
occurred” to pleading, even though impressions were still tentative.108  
 
Rules Advisory Committee, December 17, 2007, 1, 12, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2007.pdf 
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, December 17, 2007]. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee, December 8, 2009, at 2, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2009.pdf 
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, December 8, 2009]. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. at 3. 
 107  Id. 
 108  Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee, May 17, 2010, at 2, available at 
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In this 2010 Report, more empirical work was provided that largely 
showed statistical inactivity, but it also pointed to possible issues 
within civil rights cases.  The Report explained the new data points: 
“The Administrative Office has carried on a continually updated 
study of docket information for all civil actions filed in the federal 
courts, beginning two years before the Twombly decision.  The study 
counts all motions to dismiss, divided among several case categories, 
and the dispositions.”109  The largely positive results were as follows: 
“The findings show some increase in the rate of motions, and—for 
most case categories—no more than slight increases in the rate of 
granting motions.”110  But it also drew attention to the civil rights 
categories for employment cases and miscellaneous cases: 
The monthly average in employment cases for nine months 
before the Twombly decision was 1,147 cases, 527 motions to 
dismiss (46% of cases), 169 motions granted (15%), and 
108 motions denied (9%).  For nine months after Iqbal, the 
monthly average was 1,185 cases, 533 motions to dismiss 
(45%), 185 motions granted (16%), and 80 motions denied 
(7%).  The monthly average in other civil rights cases for 
nine months before Twombly was 1,334 cases, 903 motions to 
dismiss (68% of cases), 264 motions granted (20%), and 
158 motions denied (12%).  For nine months after Iqbal, 
the averages were 1,362 cases, 962 motions to dismiss 
(68%), 334 motions granted (25%), and 114 motions 
denied (8%). These figures show a substantial increase in 
the percent of motions granted.  But they cannot show the 
explanation . . . .111 
These preliminary Reports had holes, however.  As the 2009 
Report acknowledged, the “Administrative Office data base . . . does 
not permit distinctions between motions addressed to the pleadings 
and motions to dismiss based on other grounds.  Neither do the data 
reveal what happens after a motion to dismiss is granted—whether 
defects are cured by amendment . . . .”112  Nonetheless the findings 
stood as an important signpost for the early direction of the 
conversation: patience was needed, but potential emerging 
problems—particularly in civil rights cases—were not to be treated 
 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2010.pdf 
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report, May 17, 2010]. 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. 
 111  Id. at 2–3. 
 112  Advisory Committee Report, December 8, 2009, supra note 104, at 2. 
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lightly. 
B. Federal Judicial Center Report113 
Where the Advisory Committee felt its statistical data was under-
inclusive, it requested that the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) study the 
filing and resolutions of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
in much broader terms.114  Casting a far wider net, the FJC set out to 
analyze the procedural dispositions of cases from 2006 to 2010.115  
Over that range, the study compared motion activity in twenty-three 
federal district courts, which included orders that do not appear in 
legal reference systems like Westlaw.116  The project, published in 
March 2011, put forth a larger data pool on the issue than any other 
statistical study on the effects of Twombly and Iqbal to date.117 
The FJC Report’s findings are significant.  It revealed a general 
increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate of filing of motions to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim.118  In general, there was no increase in the 
 
 113  JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO 
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON CIVIL RULES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public
/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf [hereinafter FJC REPORT]. 
 114  Id. at vii. 
 115  Id.  This date range, the Report notes, filters out unwanted cases, keeping only 
those that “neither anticipat[ed] the decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly nor 
respond[ed] to the decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal in the absence of appellate court 
guidance.”  Id. at 5. 
 116  Id. at vii.  The Report was systematic in its choice of the twenty-three federal 
district courts: 
We selected the 23 federal district courts to be included in the study by 
identifying the 2 districts in each of the 11 circuits with the largest 
number of civil cases filed in 2009.  We also included the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia.  On occasion we were unable to 
obtain access to some of the courts’ codes necessary to identify all of 
the relevant motions.  In such cases, we chose the court in the circuit 
with the next greatest number of civil filings.  These 23 district courts 
account for 51% of all federal civil cases filed during this period.   
Id. at 5.  Within these district courts, the Report’s researchers were able to obtain 
considerable data sets.  Instead of using computerized legal reference systems, the 
study turned to the courts’ CM/ECF records to compile a fuller set of cases with 
relevant motions.  Id.  This provided a more complete assessment than reference 
systems because it more closely resembled excavation of files from the physical 
docket sheets.  Id.  Furthermore, while the Report was able to assess far more cases 
than any other study to date, its authors chose to exclude cases filed by prisoners and 
pro se parties, and controlled for differences in motion activity across federal district 
courts and across types of cases and for the presence of an amended complaint.  Id. 
at vii. 
 117  See sources cited, supra note 88 (collecting earlier studies). 
 118  FJC REPORT, supra note 113, at vii. 
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rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend.119  There 
was also, in particular, no increase in the rate of grants of motions to 
dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and employment 
discrimination cases.120  Only in cases challenging mortgage loans on 
both federal and state law grounds did the study find an increase in 
the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend, and 
many of these cases were removed from state court to federal court.121  
The FJC Report noted that there was no reason to believe that the 
rate of dismissals without leave to amend would have been lower in 
2006 had such cases existed then.122  It added that there was no 
increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate at which a grant of a motion to 
dismiss terminated the case.123 
The FJC Report further explained the results.  The initial 
findings showed a dramatic, albeit expected, increased rate of filing 
motions to dismiss.  Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
were filed in 6.2% of all cases in 2009–10, an increase of 2.2% over 
the filing rate for such motions in cases in 2005–06.124  Adjusted 
estimates from the data indicate that the probability of a motion to 
dismiss being filed in an individual case increased from a baseline of 
2.9% of the cases in 2006 to 5.8% of the cases in 2010.125  In civil 
rights cases other than employment discrimination, the likelihood of 
a motion to dismiss increased 0.4% from 2005–06 to 2009–10,126 an 
increase that does not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance.127  The percentage of cases with one or more motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim was higher in each month of 2009–
10 than in each month of 2005–06.128  “Moreover,” the FJC Report 
notes, “in 2009–10 there appeared to be a modest increase over time 
in the percentage of cases with such motions.”129  The trend line for 
the percentage of cases in 2005–06 with motions to dismiss was flat 
 
 119  Id. at vii, 14. 
 120  Id. at vii. 
 121  Id. This category of cases tripled in number during the relevant period in 
response to events in the housing market. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  FJC REPORT, supra note 113, at 8. 
 125  Id. at 10. 
 126  Id. at 9.  
 127  Id. at 8 
 128  Id. at 10. 
 129  Id. at 10. 
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over time, at just under 4%.130 
According to the FJC Report, however, judges are barely 
deciding these motions differently than they would have in the pre-
Twombly-Iqbal era.  The FJC Report recorded whether an order denied 
the motion to dismiss in its entirety, granted all of the relief 
requested by the motion, or granted some but not all relief requested 
by the motion.131  If the court allowed amendment of the complaint 
with regard to at least one claim that was dismissed, the analysts 
coded the motion as granted with leave to amend.132  It first appears 
that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim were more likely to 
grant all or some of the relief requested in 2010 than in 2006.133  In 
2010, 75% of the orders responding to such motions granted all or 
some of the relief requested by the motion, compared with almost 
66% of the orders in 2006.134  But closer inspection reveals that the 
increase extends only to motions granted with leave to amend, with 
no increase found in motions granted without leave to amend.135 
C. Memorandum of Circuit Court Cases136 
In addition to the strong numerical picture the FJC’s study 
paints, a memorandum reviewing relevant case law was compiled by 
the Advisory Committee’s clerk, Andrea Kuperman.  Kuperman’s 
voluminous survey primarily focuses on circuit court decisions, with a 
collection of district court cases in the appendix, and spans over 
seven hundred pages.  Right from the beginning, Kuperman makes 
an important observation: 
[T]he case law to date does not appear to indicate that Iqbal 
has dramatically changed the application of the standards 
used to determine pleading sufficiency.  Instead, the 
appellate courts are taking a context-specific approach to 
applying Twombly and Iqbal and are instructing the district 
courts to be careful in determining whether to dismiss a 
complaint . . . . The approach taken by many courts may 
 
 130  FJC REPORT, supra note 113, at 10. 
 131  Id. at 12 
 132  Id. at 13. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. at 13.   
 136  Memorandum from Andrea Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. 
Rosenthal, to Civil Rules Comm. & Standing Rules Comm., Review of Case Law 
Applying Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (Mar. 29, 2011), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules
/Iqbal_memo_March_2011.pdf. 
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suggest that Twombly and Iqbal are providing a new 
framework in which to analyze familiar pleading concepts, 
rather than an entirely new pleading standard.137 
This observation falls in line with the FJC’s findings, but gives those 
numbers a much-needed human glow.  In the many cases that 
Kuperman reviewed, the major trend in judicial thought process at 
the circuit level corroborates the numbers from the district court 
level.138 
One of Kuperman’s most interesting findings comes from a 2010 
First Circuit decision authored by then-retired Justice Souter, sitting 
by designation.139  In Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Department of Education of 
Puerto Rico, two public school teachers sued the Puerto Rico 
Department of Education, its Secretary, and the school director for 
failure to accommodate an employee’s disability as required by Title I 
of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-
12117, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.140  One 
teacher alleged that five years after he suffered a stroke, the school 
took away accommodations made for him until that point, and 
required him to take on a larger-than-usual number of students.141  
He claimed “that the new arrangement [was] an unreasonable refusal 
to accommodate, resulting in emotional consequences with physical 
 
 137  Id. at 3–4. 
 138  Kuperman’s findings also implicitly bolster the FJC’s findings by pointing to 
eight courts of appeal that have since reversed a number of early district court 
decisions to dismiss actions.  See, e.g., Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing dismissal of pro se prisoner’s claims of violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); 
W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (reversing 
dismissal of antitrust claims); Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Ctrs. 
for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010) (reversing 
dismissal of claims under the Privacy Act); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 
104 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing in part, finding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach 
of contract and defamation); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(reversing in part, finding that plaintiff stated a claim for racial discrimination); 
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009) (reversing the dismissal of the 
Fourth Amendment claims by a prisoner against two correctional officers and a 
doctor); Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) (reversing 
dismissal of claim that defendants violated fiduciary duties imposed by the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)); Siracu-sano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 
585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal of complaint alleging violation of 
federal security laws), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600 (5th 
Cir. 2009) (reversing dismissal of claimed violation of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1505 (2010). 
 139  Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of P. R., 628 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 140  Id. at 26–27. 
 141  Id. at 27. 
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symptoms requiring treatment.”142  Similarly, the other teacher 
alleged that, after receiving accommodations from the school for 
several years after suffering a throat condition, she too was forced to 
take on an increased class size.143  The district court dismissed both 
claims.144 
The First Circuit vacated the orders that held the complaints to 
be insufficient.145  After setting forth the appropriate pleading 
standard that included language from Twombly and Iqbal, as well as 
Conley, the court decided that the district court erred by demanding 
“more than plausibility.”146  From the two sets of alleged facts—first, 
that the school provided accommodations for several years, and, 
second, that the school changed these accommodations—each 
complaint was sufficient.147  Justice Souter explained: 
To be sure, this sequence of alleged facts does not describe 
a causal connection in terms of the exact psychological or 
physiological mechanism by which each plaintiff’s capacity 
continues to be overwhelmed.  But reading the allegations 
with the required favor to the plaintiff means accepting the 
changes in class size as the only variable, from which one 
would infer that there probably is some causal connection 
between the work of a doubled class size and the physical 
and emotional deterioration of the disabled teacher.148 
He further explained that “Twombly cautioned against thinking of 
plausibility as a standard of likely success on the merits; the standard 
is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be true and read in a 
plaintiff’s favor.”149  The opinion concluded: 
None of this is to deny the wisdom of the old maxim that 
after the fact does not necessarily mean caused by the fact, 
but its teaching here is not that the inference of causation is 
implausible (taking the facts as true), but that it is possible 
that other, undisclosed facts may explain the sequence 
better.  Such a possibility does not negate plausibility, 
however; it is simply a reminder that plausibility of 
allegations may not be matched by adequacy of evidence.  A 
plausible but inconclusive inference from pleaded facts will survive 
 
 142  Id. 
 143  Id. at 27–28. 
 144  Id. at 27–28. 
 145  Sepúlveda-Villarini, 628 F.3d at 30. 
 146  Id. at 29. 
 147  Id. 
 148  Id. 
 149  Id. at 30 (citation omitted). 
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a motion to dismiss, and the fair inferences from the facts 
pleaded in these cases point to the essential difference 
between each of them and the circumstances in Twombly, 
for example, in which the same actionable conduct alleged 
on the defendant’s part had been held in some prior cases 
to be lawful behavior.150 
With this, the court instituted a tempered framework for “plausibility” 
that the circuit continued to abide by in future cases.151 
Similarly, the Second Circuit’s reading of “plausibility” provided 
a tamer application than one of its district court applied.152  In Ideal 
Steel Supply Corporation v. Anza, the plaintiff, Ideal Steel, brought an 
action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962–1968, against its competitor.153  After 
years of complicated litigation, the district court dismissed one 
plaintiff’s § 1962(a) claim on the ground that the complaint did not 
sufficiently allege facts to show that the defendants’ alleged 
racketeering activity was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 
 
 150  Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
 151  See, e.g., Román-Oliveras v. P. R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2011).  
There, the court echoed Justice Souter:  
We hasten to add that we offer no view on the merits of his claim.  The 
question at this stage of the case is not “the likelihood that a causal 
connection will prove out as fact.” Sepúlveda–Villarini, 628 F.3d at 30.  
Rather, “the standard is plausibility assuming the pleaded facts to be 
true and read in a plaintiff’s favor.”  Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 
n.8, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (“[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it 
may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the 
plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove 
his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder.”).  Here, the pleaded facts 
support “[a] plausible but inconclusive inference” of discrimination 
based on disability, Sepúlveda–Villarini, 628 F.3d at 30, and [Plaintiff] is 
therefore entitled to proceed with his ADA claim. 
Id. at 50. 
 152  Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 153  Id. at 313.  In relevant part, Ideal alleged claims under two different provisions 
of RICO—section 1962(c) and section 1962(a).  Id. at 314.  Section 1962(c) makes it 
unlawful for any person employed by or associated with an enterprise  
“to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such 
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
collection of unlawful debt.”  18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).  Section 
1962(a) makes it “unlawful for any person who has received any 
income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering 
activity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such 
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest 
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise . . . .”   
Id. at § 1962(a). 
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injury.154 
The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, noting that the lower 
court’s demanded level of specificity at the pleading stage was “not 
justified by Twombly.”155  There, the higher court viewed the lower 
court’s mischaracterization and misapplication of Twombly as 
grounded in the lower court’s overly stringent reading of the 
allegations.156  After reminding the lower court that Twombly only 
requires “[f]actual allegations [that are] enough to raise a right to 
relief above the speculative level . . . i.e., enough to make the claim 
‘plausible,’” the opinion found “nothing implausible” in the 
plaintiff’s allegations.157  For that reason, the court concluded, the 
dismissal was in error. 
The Sixth Circuit, in Harvard v. Wane County, applied Twombly 
and Iqbal in a similar vein.158  In that case, an infant, through her 
guardian, brought a § 1983 action against employees of the Wayne 
County Jail.159  The mother alleged that the defendants were 
deliberately indifferent to the infant’s serious medical needs after the 
child was born in the jail.160  The mother alleged that she went into 
labor while she was detained and, after hours without medical 
assessment by prison officials, began the birthing process in her 
 
 154  Ideal Steel, 652 F.3d at 313. 
 155  Id. at 324. 
 156  See id. at 323–24. 
 157  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 158  436 Fed. App’x 451 (6th Cir. 2011).  In fact, the Sixth Circuit has reiterated 
this application on other occasions, as have its sister circuits.  See, e.g., Pulte Homes, 
Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 648 F.3d 295, 302 (6th Cir. 2011) (reversing district 
court’s dismissal because it applied “too high a standard” for sufficiency); Watson 
Carpet & Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 
2011) (“There was, however, nothing more for [Plaintiffs] to plead . . . .  A smoking 
gun—such as an email documenting that the conspiracy was ongoing—would aid 
[Plaintiff’s] case, but its absence does not render implausible that a business 
continued to adhere to the conspiratorial plan. The district court gave improper 
weight to the absence of reaffirmation.”) (internal citations omitted).  The “smoking 
gun” language comes up in other circuits, as well, and serves as a reminder that 
“plausibility” did not conflate pleading and discovery.  See, e.g., In re Text Messaging 
Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Discovery may reveal the smoking 
gun or bring to light additional circumstantial evidence that further tilts the balance 
in favor of liability.  All that we conclude at this early stage in the litigation is that the 
district judge was right to rule that the second amended complaint provides a 
sufficiently plausible case of price fixing to warrant allowing the plaintiffs to proceed 
to discovery.”). 
 159  Harvard, 436 F. App’x at 451–52. 
 160  Id. 
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cell.161  When she was finally treated by EMS, the child was born with 
no heart rate or respiration.162  The child was resuscitated, but 
suffered severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy.163  The Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s 
12(b)(6) motion.164  In explaining its standards for motions to 
dismiss, the Sixth Circuit stated that the plausibility standard does 
“not alter the basic rule that plaintiffs must plead only the basic 
elements of a claim, [plaintiffs need] not develop all of the facts 
necessary to support the claim.”165  Under this application, the 
plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient under the standard.166 
Of course, the case law includes the inevitable decisions that 
take aggressive approaches to “plausibility,” but those instances are 
the minority.167  Instead, the survey reveals a relatively stable, 
tempered application of “plausibility” pleading that comports with 
both the FJC’s and Advisory’s Committee’s statistical data. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. The Value of Empirical Data 
As a whole, empirical evaluations of procedural standards are 
underemphasized in the debate about pleading standards.  Yet the 
value of these studies cannot be overstated.  They offer the most 
thorough analysis of pleading standards under Rule 8, and they 
provide disinterested feedback that is needed to guide the 
conversation.  Numbers play a rare part in legal discourse, but they 
do have a place here.  In rare circumstances, statistical data is the best 
guidepost for next steps, particularly where the prevailing attitude 
misrepresents the realities of the situation.  Without doubt, Twombly 
 
 161  Id. at 452. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. at 452. 
 165  Harvard, 436 F. App’x at 457 (quoting Hebron v. Shelby Cnty. Gov’t, 406 F. 
App’x 28, 30 (6th Cir. 2010)). 
 166  Id. at 457–58. 
 167  See, e.g., New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc., 650 F.3d 1046, 
1050–51 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This new “plausibility” pleading standard causes a 
considerable problem for plaintiff here because defendants Scag and Louisville 
Tractor are apparently the only entities with the information [necessary to make the 
allegation] . . . .  The plaintiff apparently can no longer obtain the factual detail 
necessary because the language of Iqbal specifically directs that no discovery may be 
conducted in cases such as this, even when the information needed to establish a 
claim . . . is solely within the purview of the defendant or a third party, as it is here.”). 
SILAGI (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:51 PM 
272 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:247 
 
and Iqbal will never be held as the model of clarity, and 
commentators were right to express deep concern for the potential 
implications.  It appears now, though, that this anxiety has gathered 
too much momentum—toward “plausibility’s” speculative effects, 
rather than its actual effects. 
And where statistical data is given attention, the wrong studies 
are being privileged.  In particular, independent studies conducted 
by Professors Colleen McNamara168 and Patricia Hatamyar,169 and law 
student Kendall W. Hannon170 have gained the most attention.  These 
studies, all of which preceded the FJC’s Reports, are under-inclusive 
and surveyed case law that was still only in its budding stages.171  
Professor Hatamyar’s statistical pool was derived from a random 
selection of 1,200 district court cases, taken from the two years before 
and after Twombly, as well as the four months after Iqbal.172  Hatamyar, 
herself, cautioned that “the short time span and smaller number of 
Iqbal cases counsel caution in interpreting the data.”173  Professor 
McNamara used an even smaller sample size of 196 district court 
cases that cited Iqbal within the first six months following the 
decision’s publication, using the commercial legal database Westlaw 
to compile the list.174  Kendall Hannon’s study engaged in the largest 
data pool, with 2,212 cases citing Conley and 1,075 citing Twombly, but 
was published before the Court decided Iqbal.175 
The FJC’s pool of cases was significantly larger.  The study 
examined motion activity in 2006 and 2010 and, importantly, 
compiled cases based on their orders made available through the 
federal district court records rather than only opinions published in 
computerized legal reference systems.176  The analysts selected cases 
from twenty-three district courts, with two districts from each of the 
eleven circuits with the most civil cases filed in 2009, including the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.177  The 
 
 168  Colleen McNamara, Iqbal as Judicial Rorschach Test: An Empirical Study of District 
Court Interpretations of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 401 (2011). 
 169  Hatamyar, supra note 88.  
 170  Hannon, supra note 88.  
 171  For these studies’ results, see discussion supra Section III. 
 172  Hatamyar, supra note 88, at 555–56. 
 173  Id. at 556. 
 174  McNamara, supra note 168, at 420 (explaining selection methodology in 
further detail).  
 175  Hannon, supra note 88, at 1834–35. 
 176  FJC Report, supra note 113, at 5. 
 177  Id. 
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result was a staggering 49,443 cases with 12(b)(6) motions filed 
within ninety days of filing the case in 2005-06, and 52,925 cases with 
the same posture in 2009-10.178  Kendall Hannon’s 3,287-case pool—
the largest of the three—is only roughly 3% of the FJC’s total.  The 
FJC, with its greater resources and staff, was able to cover an 
exponentially larger number of cases in order to determine a more 
complete picture of “plausibility” application throughout the federal 
court system.  But the picture is useless unless commentators take 
time to look at it.  Given the wealth of new information the FJC has 
made available, and the indication that little has changed, the legal 
community should use this information as the new starting-point for 
determining whether change is needed. 
B. How the Courts are Reading “Plausibility” 
Before either the FJC’s reports or Kuperman’s memo were 
published, Professor Adam Steinman predicted that the lower courts 
would read the Supreme Court’s decisions in a way that preserved 
pre-Twombly precedent.179  First, Professor Steinman noted the 
decisions could not have overruled pre-Twombly authority, as such a 
rejection can only occur through the rule amendment process, not 
through judicial interpretation of Rule 8; it is simply not within the 
Court’s power to effectuate that type of change.180  Second, even if 
Rule 8 could be reasonably interpreted to require a stricter pleading 
standard, the fifty years of procedural precedent would insulate the 
Rule from such interpretation.181  Specifically, Twombly only abrogates 
one line from all the cases—the “no set of facts” language.182  Third, 
Justice Souter’s analysis of the “no set of facts” language was 
inexact.183  The language was, in practice, subject to a different, more 
sensible reading than matched what Justice Souter endorsed in 
Twombly.  Professor Steinman explains, Conley’s “no set of facts” 
language did not preclude dismissal as long as any set of facts could 
entitle the plaintiff to relief (the straw man that Twombly purported to 
strike down).  Rather, this phrase merely confirmed that speculation 
about the provability of a claim is typically not a proper inquiry at the 
pleadings phase; provability is relevant only when it appears ‘beyond 
 
 178  Id. at 9. 
 179  Steinman, supra note 6, at 1320–21.  
 180  Id. at 1320. 
 181  Id. at 1320–21. 
 182  Id. at 1321. 
 183  Id. at 1321. 
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doubt’ that the plaintiff cannot prove her claim.184 
The end result, Professor Steinman writes, is that “plausibility” 
pleading will not be a dramatic departure from the days of Conley 
because “lower courts have, essentially, a duty to reconcile Twombly 
and Iqbal with pre-Twombly case law.”185 
The FJC Report’s empirical findings have largely proved 
Professor Steinman’s predictions to be correct.  And Kuperman’s 
case studies reveal how that is happening.  The lower courts are 
playing an important role in shaping “plausibility” pleading as a 
tempered standard by making Twombly and Iqbal compatible with 
previous case law.  Her cases identify several aspects of the two 
decisions that are playing recurring roles in the reconciliation 
process. 
Uncertainty in a complaint is proving to be less troublesome to 
litigants.  First, a line in Twombly that garnered attention has ended 
up being a source of taming “plausibility”: “[f]actual allegations must 
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the 
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if 
doubtful in fact).”186  The line has become commonplace in circuit 
courts’ expressions of the Rule 8 precedent,187 and implies an 
allowance of far more uncertainty at the pleading stage than as first 
feared.  By offering the assumption of truth to doubtful facts, 
plaintiffs are resorting to this expression to help nudge their claims 
away from merely threadbare assertions. 
To further this reading, many courts have focused their analyses 
on the statement that “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if 
it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, 
and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’”188  Here, courts 
have picked up on the language of doubt—”improbable” and 
“remote and unlikely”—to acknowledge that “plausibility” pleading, 
for all its terminological changes, is still just that—an inquiry into 
 
 184  Id. (citation omitted). 
 185  Steinman, supra note 6, at 1323. 
 186  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (emphasis added). 
 187  See, e.g., Sepúlveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of Puerto Rico, 628 F.3d 25, 29 
(1st Cir. 2010); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 618 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 
578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 188  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 
(1974).  For judicial application of this phrase, see, e.g., Watson Carpet & Floor 
Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 458 (6th Cir. 2011); Ocasio-
Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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pleadings, where discovery-like facts are not required. 
Finally, Iqbal’s statement that “[d]etermining whether a 
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-
specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”189  Rather than serve as a tool for 
arbitrary judicial enforcement of “plausibility” as has been argued,190 
this sentence has worked to preserve relative consistency in 
determining sufficiency.  Where the lack of clarity within Twombly and 
Iqbal could lead to inconsistent results, judicial experience is 
consistently invoked to remind lower courts to read allegations under 
the full spectrum of Rule 8 precedent—that is, to reign in judicial 
inquiries that interpret “plausibility” in an aggressive manner. 
C. How Should We Respond? 
The upshot of these results should guide the conversation in a 
less reactionary direction by allowing the common law process to 
continue carving a path for “plausibility” pleading.191  The primary 
fear that a quick response was needed to neutralize Twombly and Iqbal 
before it affected countless litigants is quickly being extinguished.  
The proposed changes rest on the assumption that pleading 
standards became harmfully strict; yet the assumption does not stand 
muster when compared to the trends that the FJC Report indicates.  
Accordingly, the argument for change develops cracks in its 
foundation. 
A common approach to addressing “plausibility” is that change 
should come internally through the Court’s overruling of Iqbal.192  
One commentator has suggested that “[t]he best, and easiest, fix to 
this [‘plausibility’] problem is for the Iqbal case to be overruled and 
for Twombly to be read according to the ‘transactional’ method . . . .” 
instead of a “conclusory” method ushered in by Iqbal.193  But it is not 
 
 189  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
 190  See generally McNamara, supra note 168. 
 191  The Advisory Committee has suggested that it shares this sentiment. See 
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee, May 2, 2011, at 53, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2011.pdf.  
 192  See, e.g., Luke Meier, Why Twombly Is Good Law (But Poorly Drafted) And Iqbal 
Will Be Overturned, 87 IND. L.J. 709 (2012). 
 193  Id. at 759.  The “transaction method” is, in short, a reading of Twombly where a 
complaint is factually sufficient so long as it explains the underlying transaction or 
events that point to the defendant’s liability; and this method.  Id. at 741.  The 
“conclusory” interpretation of Twombly—the one that some believe Iqbal has 
inappropriately adopted—finds a complaint factually insufficient, and thereby 
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clear that overruling the decisions would be justifiable under the 
principles of stare decisis.  Specifically, proponents of this approach 
would have to explain its unworkability.  While initial concerns about 
“plausibility” may have given rise to colorable arguments for the 
standard’s unworkability, the case studies and reports suggest that is 
not the case in practice.  In fact, the lack of significant change 
between pre- and post-Iqbal empirical data suggests that these issues 
have not been exacerbated in any meaningful way by “plausibility” 
itself.  Of course, that is not to say that the pleading as a whole could 
not use revision; the doctrine is far from perfect.  But what the 
numbers do tell us is that Twombly and Iqbal are not the impetus for 
those problems.  Without that critical link, any reasoning that 
pleading standards need revision specifically because of these cases 
does not hold water. 
If anything, the sweeping change that critics believe will re-
stabilize the pleading process has the potential to do just the 
opposite.  This holds especially true in regard to proposed rule 
amendments.  With any amendment, particularly to a rule that 
maintains the entryway to the court, uncertainty in application will 
initially cause confusion and threatens to affect almost all civil cases 
brought after that time. 
Conversely, based on case development and data, the position 
that Twombly and Iqbal did not break the federal pleading system 
should encourage the Advisory Committee to maintain its current 
course.  The devil, now, is in the details of the Twombly and Iqbal, and 
incremental advancements of district and circuit courts’ 
understanding of “plausibility” will ensure that the system can 
improve itself without risking a major, potentially unsettling jolt. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Determining the necessity of change requires the availability of 
diverse sources.  The FJC and Advisory Committee have advanced the 
conversation immensely with their research.  Their findings largely 
confirm the predictions of commentators like Professor Steinman, 
who anticipated a tempered application of “plausibility” pleading.  
And where the FJC Report’s empirical data lacks judicial analysis, 
Kuperman’s Advisory Committee memo fills in the gaps.  It is now the 
legal community’s obligation to acknowledge these results and to use 
 
subject to a “plausibility” analysis, because it contains conclusory allegations.  Id.  
Because the “transactional method” is more true to Rule 8, the Court can ostensibly 
snuff out the “conclusory” approach by expressly overruling Iqbal. 
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them to redirect any misguided positions.  The solutions need to be 
reframed to account for the tempered application of that precedent.  
Only then, with full attention given to the practicalities of 
“plausibility,” can a legitimate reevaluation be made of Twombly, Iqbal, 
and the entire pleading system.  Nonetheless, while the reevaluation 
is being crafted, the main point still stands: litigants can safely plead 
on. 
 
